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Abstract: In order to comply with specific regulations (eIDAS, Payment Services Directive, Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive) and reduce risk profiles, financial service providers increasingly collect large 
amounts of information from their customers. The increasing opportunities and technical means for 
data collection afforded from digitalisation raise legal concerns related to proportionality, necessity, 
and data minimization. However, the concerns go beyond just GDPR compliance and legislative 
balance, as distinct architectures and technological deployments potentially impact rights, freedoms, 
and ethics. This paper will address the issue by examining aspects of digital identity, especially those 
that have proposed the use of a permissioned distributed ledger or blockchain as architecture for 
know your customer and onboarding evidential frameworks, using specific hashing schemes that 
derive unique identifiers from the combination of specific personal data points. Evidence is appended 
to a data structure, for the purpose of auditing and/or record keeping, potentially ensuring an 
immutable record of events is maintained. After elaborating on the notion of identity in the digital 
sphere and the applicability of the GDPR to such a data structure, the discussion will be developed to 
critically assess the current trend towards using the financial institutions’ customers’ mobile devices as 
interfaces to the distributed data structure and the legal and sociological implications of this 
technological development. The potential impact of the analysis goes beyond digital identity within the 
finance sector, positioning the discussion towards approaches for e-governance and the regulation of 
digital identity in a way that human dignity is preserved and the risks of creating a ubiquitous “digital 
avatar” are adequately addressed by the law. 
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I.  Introduction  
“WE CAN, I think, describe cases in which, though we know the answer to every other 
question, we have no idea how to answer a question about personal identity.”1 
The 21st century has brought with it a host of technologically leveraged socio-economic 
change. The omniscient internet, rooted in the ubiquitous nature of our relationship with the 
net-connected device, has altered the way in which the individual interfaces with reality; real, 
augmented, and virtual. Floridi professes that omnipotent information and communication 
technologies radically alter our sense of self, dispelling incumbent notions of individuality by 
dualistically evolving our understanding of both the public and the private sphere;2 reshaping 
relationships with family, friends, individuals, entities, and government. Modern technologies 
surreptitiously move us closer to the centre of the ‘infosphere’, a world in which corporations 
gain considerable power and control over our digital lives, entrenching us in an explicit power 
imbalance as they mine the data we generate for behavioural insights,3 predictive 
personalization,4 and profit.5 The existent incentives in play for digital traceability have 
focused efforts on digital identity as companies seek to attach unique, robust, and persistent 
identifiers to individuals as they traverse the open internet: browsing, shopping, and 
interacting with forums and applications. The trend towards mobile interfaced product and 
service provision has hastened the distinct need for an interoperable, secure, inclusive, and 
privacy-respecting system to be developed. Formal electronic identity (e-ID) systems have 
been deployed in jurisdictions within Europe (Estonia - e-ID) and further abroad (India - 
Aadhar), intended for use with both public and private sector services. However, considerable 
obstacles remain for digital identity-based technologies to achieve broad adoption, as 
ideological, technological, legal, and ethical questions have yet to be answered adequately.6 
While digital identity has potential to ease friction in the European Digital Single Market, there 
is no universally agreed method for achieving the aims of such a system, nor have the system 
requirements been adequately communicated across all sectors. Topics such as privacy, data 
protection, inclusivity, fundamental rights, and structural power imbalance continually 
surface as architectures are proposed.7 At the forefront of this conversation is the financial 
                                                                
1  Parfit, Personal Identity, 80 The Phil. Rev. 3, 3 (1971). 
2  Floridi, The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere is reshaping Human Reality (2014). 
3  E.g. Alzubaidi/Kalita, Authentication of Smartphone Users Using Behavioral Biometrics, IEEE Communications Surveys & 
Tutorials (2016) 1998; Mahfouz et al., A Survey on Behavioral Biometric Authentication on Smartphones, J. of Info. Sec. & 
Applications (2017) 28. 
4    Yeung, Five Fears about Mass Predictive Personalization in an Age of Surveillance Capitalism, Int’l Data Priv. L. (2018) 258. 
5  See Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2019) 27–198. 
6  See Priv. International, A Guide to Litigating Identity Systems https://privacyinternational.org/learning-resources/ 
guide-litigating-identity-systems (last visited November 12, 2021). 
7      See Gstrein/Kochenov, Digital Identity and Distributed Ledger Technology: Paving the Way to a Neo-Feudal Brave New World?           
 Frontiers in Blockchain (2020) 1. 
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services sector.8 The emergence of the open-banking era has foregrounded the distinct need 
to provide a secure banking customer identification and authentication method, which can 
simultaneously provide for the needs of risk mitigation on behalf of the banks, whilst reducing 
onboarding costs. These efforts have been further buttressed by regulatory instruments such 
as the Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the Payment Services Directive and eIDAS regulation, 
as the Commission has sought to establish a technologically neutral legislative base for the 
deployment of cross-jurisdiction e-ID provision. This paper will provide an overview of digital 
identity and distributed ledger technology, providing insight into the nature of the current 
debate on the matter. Some of the key legal complexities at the heart of ongoing discussions 
will be detailed, shedding light on legal grey areas, whilst discussing potential ramifications 
and implications from legal, ethical, and privacy-orientated perspectives. While digital identity 
promises significant value, there are fundamental threats to existing European rights and 
freedoms should such systems be deployed. This is especially the case as financial service 
providers are closely related to state authorities, being highly involved in various crime 
detection schemes (in regard to money laundering, tax or payment fraud), either acting as 
agents of, or being (partially) publicly funded by, the state. Insight will also be provided into 
the nature of the interface – the mobile phone – in an attempt to understand how the device 
acts simultaneously as a gateway for digital identity, and the interface into our most personal 
and sensitive data-driven lives. Bridging the two brings with it enormous potential and 
substantial dangers – especially if the gateway is controlled and maintained by unscrupulous 
actors.  
 
II.  Digital Identity and Distributed Ledger Technology 
The concept of digital identity emerged long before the creation, adoption and acceptance of 
distributed ledger technology. Identity has always been a cornerstone of society, a concept 
that binds one’s understanding of the self, one’s relationship with the external world, and 
perhaps most importantly the external world’s relation to oneself. Parfit elucidates the notion 
of identity, framing it as a derivation of the nuanced relationship between mind and body – 
an extension of “Cogito, ergo sum” (I think therefore I am), the basis for Cartesian duality9 – 
through a concept termed ‘psychological continuity’.10 Parfit outlines the notion of one’s 
identity as being situated in psychology (the mind) more than physiology (the body). This 
territorialises identity further into realms of personality, amassed experience, memories (q-
memory),11 and the formation of ‘the self’.  
An OECD working paper recognises the dichotomy between self and identity through the 
concept of ‘personhood’, told through the lens of the information age.12 The authors note:  
                                                                
8     See Kaiser, Privacy and Identity Issues in Financial Transactions: The Proportionality of the European Anti-Money Laundering     
      Legislation (2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Groningen) (on file with the University of Groningen Library). 
9  Cf. Descartes, A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One’s Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences (Ian 
Maclean ed. & trans., Oxford World’s Classics 2006) (1637) 28–34. 
10  Parfit, Personal Identity, 10. 
11  Parfit, Personal Identity, 14. 
12  See Rundle et al., At a Crossroads: “Personhood” and Digital Identity in the Information Society (STI Working Paper No. 
2007/7, 2008) https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/40204773.doc (last visited November 12, 2021). 




“Law and technology must be crafted to respect certain ’Properties of Identity‘ in identity 
management (IDM) in order for the information society to be free and open. Respect for the 
Properties of Identity is necessary for data protection; data protection is necessary for 
accountability; and accountability is necessary for trust.”13  
Rundle et al foreground the philosophical roots of identity by conveying how and why trust, 
accountability, data protection, and user control are key to any successful, respectful, and 
human-centric IDM system.14 By pointing to philosophers Locke and Hegel, the authors 
situate the conversation in concepts of ‘the person’ – framing the relationship between citizen 
and state through a formal legislative lens. More importantly, the authors acknowledge that 
IDM systems might potentially undermine notions of personhood, reminding us that 
fundamental rights are attributable to a person and not to any conveyance of digital identity 
(or the set of identifiers). This nuanced distinction opens up discussion surrounding the 
explicit need to protect and preserve the digital integrity of the individual15 in order to 
safeguard, protect, and preserve the rights, freedoms, privacy and physical, legal, and ethical 
integrity of the person; especially pertinent as society ventures further into an information 
age, where one interacts as a digital agent as much (if not more than) as a physical agent – 
often engaging in augmented spaces where the lines between real and virtual begin to blur.16 
Indeed, the basic concept of legal subjectivity requires that individuals have rights and duties: 
They can be held accountable for their actions but at the same time are entitled to the 
protection of their fundamental rights, as only the guaranteed protection of fundamental 
rights allows for the free development of an individual’s identity in the first place. The 
requirement for protection in this regard is further buttressed at the European level with 
initiatives to develop and implement a Declaration of Digital Principles,17 an initiative that 
provides a pathway for the further protection of the individual and their digital interactions. 
Mechanisms for identification and authentication have always been cornerstones of Identity 
Management systems. In a technologically interfaced world, robust methods for identifying 
and authenticating users are paramount, primarily to preserve both information security and 
authorised access.18 The most common method for this has previously been username and 
password combinations – the username acting as an identifier for a user, and the password 
as authentication method. The security of the process rests on the hypothesis that only the 
                                                                
13  Rundle et al., “Personhood” and Digital Identity, 4 https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/40204773.doc (last visited November 
12, 2021). 
14  Cf.  Rundle et al., “Personhood” and Digital Identity, 6 https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/40204773.doc (last visited 
November 12, 2021). 
15  See Guillaume/Mahon, Le Droit à l’Intégrité numérique (2021); see Rochel, Connecting the Dots: Digital Integrity as a Human 
Right, Hum. Rts. L. Rev. (2021) 358. 
16  See Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (Sheila Glaser trans., University of Michigan Press 1994) (1981) 121–128. 
17  European Commission, Declaration of Digital Principles – the ‘European Way’ for the digital society 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13017-Declaration-of-Digital-Principles-the-
%E2%80%98European-way%E2%80%99-for-the-digital-society_en (last visited November 12, 2021). 
18  See National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Identity Guidelines: NIST Special Publication 800-63-3 (2017) 2 
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63-3 (last visited November 12, 2021). 
ALJ 2021 Schreier/Renwick/Ehrke-Rabel 206 
 
 
correct user (the identity holder) will know or have access to the password (the authentication 
method).  
Alongside the apparent loss of permeability and traceability afforded by the increasing 
interweavement of physicality and digitality, there is a push for greater digital accountability 
and traceability – as sectors seek to robustly tie individuals to their digital transactions and 
interactions. This desire is most present in the financial services sector, where legal 
obligations exist regarding money laundering and terrorist financing. The requirement to 
maintain evidential registries of customers, to thwart illegal activity, leads us to distributed 
ledger technology. DLT, initially envisioned as a tool to subvert the existing financial system; 
a vehicle for the ideological libertarian to disintermediate their existence,19 has been adopted 
by mainstream private sector entities (as well as the public sector). Entities seek to implement 
the data structure in a host of use cases: supply chain management, capital acquisition 
processes, land registries, etc. One of the potentially most lucrative use cases is identity 
management – as distributed ledger technology provides a sound technical architecture 
through which identities and related attributes or credentials may be stored, shared, and 
verified. 
DLT allows for the recording and storing of information (such as personal data of customers 
relevant for complying with existing Anti Money Laundering provisions) in a transparent, 
tamper-resistant,20 resilient, and decentralised way.21 New information is included within a 
‘block’, which is then appended to the chain after having been validated by the network.22 Due 
to the fact that replications of the data stored on the blockchain can be found on computers 
all over the world,23 the data structure is highly resilient. Moreover, ex-post changes in the 
data structure are hard to achieve, as blocks are linked together through the inclusion of the 
hash of the previous block in the following block’s header, rendering the structure tamper-
resistant.24 
The concept of Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) (seen as one of the cornerstone concepts of 
modern digital identity architectures) emerged adjacent to the initial forming of DLT 
technology, as the Web-of Trust25 initiative forged ahead with methods to link distributed 
technologies with existing methods for identification and authentication. The concept has 
                                                                
19  See De Filippi, Bitcoin: A Regulatory Nightmare to a Libertarian Dream, Internet Pol’y Rev. (2014) 1; Karlstrøm, Do Libertarians 
dream of Electronic Coins? Scandinavian J. of Soc. Theory (2014) 23.  
20  See Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified: A Technical and Legal Introduction to Distributed and Centralized Ledgers, 25 
Richmond J. of L. & Tech. 1, 10 (2018) (discussing the properties of distributed ledger technology); see Low/Mik, Pause the 
Blockchain Legal Revolution, 69 Int’l & Compar. L. Q. (2020) 135, 137 (discussing the properties of blockchain technology). 
21  Cf. Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified 5–6; see Bechtolf/Vogt, Datenschutz in der Blockchain: Eine Frage der Technik, ZD 
2018, 66 (67); see Zetzsche et al., The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, U. Ill. L. Rev. 
1361, 1371 (discussing the properties of distributed ledger technology). 
22  E.g. Zachariadis et al., Governance and Control in Distributed Ledgers: Understanding the Challenges facing Blockchain 
Technology in Financial Services, 29 Info. & Org. (2019) 105, 109 (discussing the process of validating new information in a 
block which is then appended to the previously validated block). 
23  E.g. De Filippi/Wright, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code (2018) 34. 
24  Filippi/Wright, Blockchain and the Law 22, 36; see Steinbrück, Identitätsverwaltung über die Blockchain? Rechtliche 
Betrachtung am Beispiel des Internets der Dinge, in Schweighofer et al. (eds.), Internet of Things (2019) 283 (283–84). 
25  Web of Trust https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo (last visited November 12, 2021). 




since evolved, through the development of a principles-based ideology.26 At the root of the 
ideology is the desire to pursue identity systems based on decentralised ideals, moving away 
from formal top-down, centralised identification mechanisms. The risks in centralised Identity 
Management Systems originate from vulnerabilities concerning the integrity and availability 
of personal data, as well as the possibility to link multiple identity attributes together by a 
single authority or enterprise, providing channels for extremely personalised and valuable 
insights regarding interactions and behaviour to be drawn.27 Distributed Ledger Technology 
has been proposed to overcome this centralised approach,28 as the data structure, in 
principle, does not contain a single point of failure.29 
Although Distributed Ledger Technology has characteristics deemed suitable for a robust and 
secure identity management system, challenges remain – especially those that impact on 
specific rights and freedoms of individuals.30 These challenges are even more pronounced if 
systems are proposed in a top-down fashion – tools for monitoring identity formation and 
identity evolution of individuals. DLT provides a structure from which records, entries, and 
transactions can be trivially linked together or further coupled with associated data sets either 
explicitly (time stamping and signing), or due to the meta-data leakages from the system 
(transaction propagation information, transaction hashes, IP address leaks, etc). In this 
instance, core properties of DLT based identity management systems may become operands 
of harm, outweighing any presupposed benefits, by altering the balance of power between 
the formal identity provider (the state) and the identity holder (the person), akin to 
prefigurative post-political strategy.31 Moreover, the gateway to the distributed ledger – the 
wallet holding the user’s credentials related to the user’s private key – creates a link between 
the user’s “analogue” identity and his “digital” identity – either represented by the hash value 
of their credentials stored on the blockchain for evidential purposes, or the address for their 
Decentralised Identifier32 (DID), which in turn contains information regarding ownership, use, 
and interactions concerning identity credentials. Additionally, a digital identity wallet stores 
the credentials which contain both sensitive and non-sensitive personal data, thus security 
and fraud mitigation measures are required to be implemented to prevent unauthorised 
access. These mitigation measures often comprise far-reaching device data analysis methods 
as will be discussed in the following. 
 
                                                                
26  Sovrin, Principles of SSI https://sovrin.org/principles-of-ssi/ (last visited November 12, 2021). 
27  Referred to as „Enterprise-Centric-Identity” in Zanol et al., Self-Sovereign Identity und Blockchain, in Schweighofer et al. (eds.), 
Data Protection / Legal Tech (2018) 235 (235). 
28  See Zwitter et al., Digital Identity and the Blockchain: Universal Identity Management and the Concept of the “Self-Sovereign” 
Individual, Frontiers in Blockchain (2020) 1 (2–10). 
29  Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified 22; cf. Zetzsche et al., Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers 1374. 
30  See Goodell/Aste, A Decentralized Digital Identity Architecture, Frontiers in Blockchain (2019) 1. 
31  See Husain et al., Prefigurative Post-Politics as Strategy: The Case of Government-Led Blockchain Projects, The J. of the Brit. 
Blockchain Ass’n (2019) 1. 
32  W3C, Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0 https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/ (last visited November 15, 2021). 
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III.  Legal challenges to using distributed ledger technology as onboarding 
evidential framework  
Although distributed ledger technology promises to constitute a fertile technical environment 
for concepts of digital identity, the societal implications of implementing the technology 
should be carefully considered, as deployment of a mandatory digital identity architecture 
may cement existing power structures and imbalances in power.33 Concurrently, the use of a 
permissioned blockchain network as an evidential framework for customer onboarding in the 
finance sector also poses specific legal challenges. In order to fully acknowledge the legal 
implications of such an identity management system, the means of storing the identity related 
data and the means of accessing this data from the user’s perspective have to be considered: 
In the context of digital identity provision, the peer-to-peer characteristics of the distributed 
ledger technology deployed are relativized by the fact that bank customers do not themselves 
operate a node within the blockchain network, but rather demonstrate ownership over their 
hashed credentials stored on the blockchain via digital identity wallets.34 Thus, the inherent 
properties of distributed ledger technology and the fact that service providers in the sector 
collect vast amounts of sensitive personal data of their customers using wallets stored on 
their mobile phones as a gateway to the ledger are prone to interfere with the concept of 
human dignity if not properly framed. 
A. Legal Challenges arising from the Deployment of Distributed Ledger 
Technology  
While some scholars initially deemed distributed ledger technology disruptive in the context 
of regulation, due to its revolutionary peer-to-peer characteristics,35 the law is not yet 
overturned by distributed structures for identity management.36 Some specific questions 
relating to the deployment of DLT as evidential framework for onboarding customers will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
1. Personal data or non-personal data? 
If a distributed ledger structure is used by players in the finance sector to record specific 
information (as evidence) about individuals, the legal qualification of the data processed 
becomes foregrounded. There are specific legal requirements within the finance sector, 
especially if the data structure is intended for use as a decentralised evidential registry for 
customers who have passed an identification verification process.37 The data recorded on-
ledger is derived from an onboarding setting (identity verification) and relates to a natural 
person – for example name, date, place of birth, information about purpose and intended 
nature of the business relationship with an individual, and biometric data which are required 
                                                                
33  See Gstrein/Kochenov, Digital Identity and Distributed Ledger Technology 5. 
34  Cf. Zwitter et al., Digital Identity and the Blockchain 11. 
35  Cf. Dimitropoulos, The Law of Blockchain, 95 Wash. L. Rev. (2020) 1117, 1122 (discussing the possibilities offered by 
blockchain technology); Svikhart, Blockchain’s Big Hurdle, 70 Stanford L. Rev. Online (2017) 100, 101. 
36  See De Filippi/Wright, Blo2ckchain and the Law 174–175, 179. 
37  E.g. Moyano/Ross, KYC Optimization Using Distributed Ledger Technology, Bus. & Info. Sys. Eng’g (2017) 411. 




according to Anti-Money-Laundering provisions38 – therefore, the information processed in 
the blockchain qualifies as personal data.39 The data relates directly to an identifiable person, 
even if the source personal data (represented through a credential or series of credentials) 
has been hashed prior to being stored. Knowledge of the customer data which functioned as 
input data for the hash value allows for the hash on the blockchain to be at least theoretically 
related to an individual, as it is used as verifiable proof that a distinct individual has passed 
an identity verification process, even though it may be practically unfeasible to reverse-
engineer the hash value to determine the input data from the hash value alone.  
The hashing of the input data unambiguously constitutes processing of personal data in the 
sense of Article 4 paragraph 2 GDPR. Whether hash values derived from personal data qualify 
as pseudonymised or anonymised data depends on various elements, such as the algorithm 
used for computing the hash, the entropy of the input data, or the extent of pre-processing 
of the input data.40 Contrary to anonymised data, pseudonymised data allows the 
identification of a person and thus qualifies as personal data. According to the case law of 
the CJEU an identifiable person is a person who can be identified, directly or indirectly.41 
“Indirectly” means that it is not necessary that the information alone allows the data subject 
to be identified.42 As long as a data point is directly linked to the hash value stored on the 
ledger and technically related to the digital wallet of the customer, the hash value is personal 
data. A direct link between the DID and the private key that controls the DID ensures that the 
person may be identified. In this respect it is necessary to establish whether data can qualify 
as personal data from the perspective of one person and non-personal data from the 
perspective of another person. According to the Breyer decision by the CJEU (with regard to 
dynamic IP-addresses), “it is not required that all the information enabling the identification 
of the data subject must be in the hands of one person”.43 However, the Court further states 
that pseudonymised data can only qualify as personal data, if the possibility to combine the 
pseudonymised data with the additional data held by another person constitutes “a means 
likely reasonably to be used to identify the data subject.”44 This shall not be the case if the 
identification of the data subject was prohibited by law or practically impossible on account 
of the fact that it requires disproportionate effort in terms of time, cost and man-power, so 
that the risk of identification in reality appears to be insignificant.45 
                                                                
38  Directive 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, as last amended by Directive 2018/843, art. 13 
para. 1 lit. a and c, 2018, O.J. (L 156) 43, 56 (EU). 
39  Cf. Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified 61, 63. 
40  Agencia Española Protección Datos & Eur. Data Prot. Supervisor, Introduction to the Hash Function as a Personal Data 
Pseudonymisation Technique (2019) 21 https://edps.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publication/19-10-30_aepd-
edps_paper_hash_final_en.pdf (last visited November 15, 2021); see Finck/Pallas, They who must not be identified – 
distinguishing personal from non-personal data under the GDPR, 10 Int’l. Data Priv. L. (2020) 11, 25 (elaborating on hash-
based ID replacement and the qualification of the hash value as personal data). 
41  See EugH 19.10.2016, C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, 40. 
42  EugH 19.10.2016, C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, 41. 
43  EugH 19.10.2016, C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, 43. 
44  EugH 19.10.2016, C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, 45. 
45  EugH 19.10.2016, C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, 46. 
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Consequently, depending on the architecture of the blockchain and the legal and factual 
relationship between the nodes running the blockchain and the wallet providers storing the 
hash-related personal data off-chain on the one side, and on the operator using the hash 
value on the other, the hash value can either qualify as non-personal or personal data. From 
the perspective of the nodes, it qualifies as non-personal data if the technology that connects 
the information contained in the off-chain wallet to the hash value cannot be accessed by 
nodes in the network, and if the nodes and the wallet are not operated by the same persons. 
Furthermore, it must be ascertained whether source data is stored separately after the 
hashing, and whether future developments in specific technologies and computing power 
may permit the re-identification of hashed personal data, even if the hash function was 
deemed secure at the time of hashing.46 This is especially relevant given the fact that data 
stored on a distributed ledger is difficult to amend47 and, if new possibilities to relate hash 
values to individuals evolve, the data has already been distributed to as many entities as there 
are validating nodes in the network.48 The hash value could thus over time transform from 
non-personal data to personal data. 
For the wallet provider in charge of facilitating the cryptographic proof that the hash value 
relates to a specific set of personal data, the hash value will always qualify as personal data. 
The link between the hash value and the input data can furthermore be established by the 
relying party receiving the credential for purposes of verification and by the issuing party 
which is also aware of this link. Consequently, except for the blockchain running nodes under 
specific circumstances, even if following the relative criterion of the possibility of re-
identification the ECJ seems to establish through the Breyer judgment,49 a hash value 
representing personal data has to be deemed pseudonymous, rather than anonymous,50 
especially as persistent identifiers linked to individuals’ data or public keys are used to 
determine an individual’s identity in order to comply with existing KYC and AML requirements. 
2. Allocation of Legal Responsibility in Distributed Ledgers 
It has been demonstrated that the hashing constitutes processing of personal data and that 
the hash value itself qualifies as personal data if linked to the underlying personal data. It has 
also been elaborated that only under certain (technical) prerogatives the hash value qualifies 
as non-personal data. In order to comply with GDPR requirements and to be able to have 
legal assurance that a specific technical set up does not allow the indirect identification of a 
natural person, legal responsibility needs to be analysed. 
Within GDPR, the key figure for enabling compliance and the protection of the data subjects’ 
rights is the data controller.51 In so far as wallet providers act off-chain they qualify as data 
                                                                
46  E.g. Zanol et al., Self-Sovereign Identity und Blockchain 240. 
47  E.g. Finck, Blockchains and Data Protection in the European Union, 4 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. (2018) 17, 19 (characteristics of 
blockchains functioning as data storage). 
48  E.g. Zanol et al., Self-Sovereign Identity und Blockchain 240. 
49  EugH 19.10.2016, C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, 45, 48–49. 
50  E.g. Dimitropoulos, The Law of Blockchain 1128; Finck, Blockchains and Data Protection 17, 22–23; Martini/Weinzierl, Die 
Blockchain-Technology und das Recht auf Vergessenwerden, in NVwZ 2017, 1251 (1257). 
51  E.g. Buocz et al., Bitcoin and the GDPR: Allocating Responsibility in Distributed Networks, 35 Comput. L. & Sec. Rev. (2019) 
182, 183 (discussing the addressees of duties according to GDPR). 




controllers with regard to the processing of personal data contained in the wallet and with 
regard to the link that is created to the hash value on the blockchain. As for the hash value 
stored on the distributed ledger, legal responsibility is not certain. Although the GDPR has 
been drafted to be technology agnostic,52 the question of who ultimately retains control over 
personal data on a distributed ledger is unclear. Naturally, the issue has been deemed 
especially delicate regarding permissionless blockchains,53 but even in a permissioned 
distributed ledger, the allocation of legal responsibility is complex, as copies of the ledger are 
held by multiple nodes. 
When interpreting the existing rules on the definition of the data controller, there is no 
definite answer as to who retains the control over the processing, as the result relies on the 
fact that network nodes may be seen as both controllers and as processors, depending on 
the perspective.54 Alternatively, the whole distributed ledger could be deemed a joint 
venture.55 A yet further possibility would be to deem the party controller which has control 
over granting access to the blockchain network.56 Despite possible interpretative solutions, 
legal uncertainty remains for both the (potential) controllers and the data subjects. 
Within a permissioned system all node operators subscribe to pre-determined system and 
governance rules, and in doing so trust is established.57 While establishing a contractual 
relationship between system operators, nodes and other participants may turn out to be 
practical in some cases,58 the law should protect the customer by providing a “default”-option 
if there is no such contract. This implies a need for legal rules and, hence, supervision by the 
state as a “last resort”. On a permissioned blockchain, this could be achieved by holding 
systems operators and wallet providers who operate as newly established intermediaries 
responsible.59 However, regarding the principle that one can only be held responsible for 
what he has the power to control, due regard must be given to these intermediaries’ power 
to exercise control over the distributed ledger. 
Codes of Conduct (CoC) have been proposed to aid proper functioning of certain technology 
dependent sectors. In the context of digital identity, the latest proposed eIDAS amendment 
places specific emphasis on how a proposed European wide digital identity ecosystem will 
rely on Member States adopting a specifically tailored CoC to ensure that rights, freedoms 
                                                                
52  See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the free Movement of such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), 
at 4, COM (2012) 11 final. 
53  See Buocz et al., Bitcoin and the GDPR 197; see Moerel, Blockchain and Data Protection, in DiMatteo et al. (eds.), The 
Cambridge Handbook of Smart Contracts, Blockchain Technology and Digital Platforms (2019) 213 (215–216). 
54  Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified 66–67. 
55  Zetzsche et al., The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers 1390, mentioning that this could be an especially viable 
interpretation, if the distributed ledger is set up by a core group which uses the ledger for their purposes. 
56  Piska/Wagner, Zukunftstechnologie Blockchain und wie man den Stolperstein DSGVO vermeiden, ZTR 2018, 195 (199). 
57  See Low/Mik, Pause the Blockchain Legal Revolution 140. 
58  See Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified 74. 
59  Dimitropoulos, The Law of Blockchain 1190; Moerel, Blockchain and Data Protection 216. 
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and specific security requirements are adhered to60 while other jurisdictions have proposed 
the use of a ‘Trust Framework’,61 but it is not yet clear how these will be adopted or mandated 
sector-wide, let alone regulated across jurisdictions. Open identity initiatives such as Sovrin62 
and Trust-over-IP63 have proposed similar, intimating that machine-readable governance 
mechanisms and regulated trust registries may be the most effective method to solve 
complex regulatory issues. However, concerns remain that these mechanisms, and CoCs will 
be self-regulatory instruments, as opposed to tools for greater legal and judicial oversight. 
These concerns are specifically important where fundamental rights of natural persons are 
endangered. In order to effectively regulate the legal responsibility for the data flows in a 
permissioned blockchain, further regulatory effort is required in order to ensure that effective 
protection is granted to data subjects.64 
The allocation of legal responsibility is not only relevant for GDPR, but also in regard to other 
regulations, such as Anti-Money Laundering provisions. As every bank or financial institution 
is by itself liable for implementing know-your-customer measures, the mere fact that a bank 
receives verifiable credentials of an onboarded customer does not free it from the 
responsibility of collecting the necessary personal data.65 Moreover, current Anti-Money 
Laundering Law requires every financial institution to retain certain documents relating to 
their customers, preventing an entirely decentralised solution.66 In regard to the provisions 
of the Directive on the Security of Network and Information systems,67 challenges also arise 
concerning the allocation of legal accountability for complying with security and incident 
notification requirements.68 
B. The Interface for Accessing the Distributed Ledger – The Customer´s 
Digital Identity Wallet 
On the surface, it seems appealing that the data owner is the only individual who holds the 
means to access and manage their identity credentials, but the technical management of the 
user’s private key is often left to wallet providers, storing the private keys off-chain, but not 
offline.69 Even if the hash values might appear as anonymous to an individual looking at the 
                                                                
60  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards 
establishing a framework for a European Digital Identity [hereinafter Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Framework for 
a European Digital Identity], art. 12b, at 28–29, COM (2021) 281 final. 
61 UK Government, The UK Digital Identity and Attributes Trust Framework  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-digital-identity-and-attributes-trust-framework/the-uk-digital-identity-
and-attributes-trust-framework#rules-for-all-trust-framework-participants (last visited November 15, 2021). 
62  Sovrin, Sovrin Governance Framework https://sovrin.org/library/sovrin-governance-framework/ (last visited November 15, 
2021). 
63  Trust Over IP Foundation, Governance Stack https://trustoverip.org/working-groups/governance-stack/ (last visited 
November 15, 2021). 
64  Cf. Finck, Blockchains and Data Protection 35; Stadler/Bichler, Die Blockchain-Technologie im Lichte der DSGVO, ZIIR 2019, 
382 (393). 
65  Directive 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 25, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 73, 95 (EU). 
66  Directive 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 40, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 73, 95 (EU), as last amended by 
Council Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156) 43, 65 (EU). 
67  Directive 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2016 O.J. (L 194) 1 (EU). 
68  Directive 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 14, 2016 O.J. (L 194) 1, 20 (EU). 
69  See Low/Mik, Pause the Blockchain Legal Revolution 158. 




public blockchain without any additional information, they relate to a natural person’s real 
identity by means of the wallet holding the credentials which functioned as an input for the 
hash values stored on the ledger. Moreover, through the wallet, the user’s credentials can be 
shared or exported off-chain.70 The wallet provider thus functions as a central threat 
surface,71 exposing the vulnerability of the whole system and the personal data processed 
within it,72 and thus requiring appropriate regulation in order to protect individuals’ rights. 
Not only is the wallet provider a central conduit for access to the network, phone operating 
systems act as gateways to the digital domain – with the privacy preferences of platform 
providers baselining the privacy affordances of application developers.73 This raises privacy 
concerns as wallet providers exercise the technical safeguard for the private key of the 
customer which is crucial to maintain control over the customer’s identity credentials. 
Additionally, the wallet provider potentially has access to the hashed credentials stored on 
the blockchain, including the customer’s biometric data, and is thus in fact in control over the 
identity of the data subject even beyond the digital sphere, as the digital identity becomes a 
crucial part of real-life access to financial services. Although the privacy issues related to wallet 
providers being newly created intermediaries seem to have been acknowledged by the 
European Commission’s proposal for an amendment of eIDAS regulation,74 future 
developments will show whether the issuance of a digital identity wallet by the Member 
States,75 under a mandate from the Member States or recognised by the Member States will 
solve the privacy concerns or reinforce them. 
In a digital wallet ecosystem, the digital identity wallet stored on the mobile phone allows 
customers to access and exercise control over their credentials. However, the customers’ 
mobile phones are simultaneously used by financial service providers for fraud mitigation 
purposes. Fraud mitigation depends on proper safeguarding of the device, the access it 
affords, and the information contained on it. It is crucial to detect and prevent unauthorized 
use, whether through access to the user’s personal data directly, or fraud attempts that use 
the bank customer’s identity credentials.76 The information collected from a bank customer’s 
mobile device is moving towards increasingly privacy-invasive methods such as message 
analysis, network log analysis, social network analysis, interaction pattern analysis, and 
                                                                
70  Where the hashes of the credentials are stored on the blockchain, as described in the “Claim Registry Model”, the identity 
claims may be stored off-chain, for example in the wallet, see Mühle et al., A Survey on Essential Components of a Self-
Sovereign Identity, 30 Comput. Sci. Rev. (2018) 80, 81 (discussing different variations of self-sovereign identity architectures); 
and the corresponding private key proves custody and ownership of the claims in that specific wallet, see Wang/De Filippi, 
Self-Sovereign Identity in a Globalized World: Credentials-Based Identity Systems as a Driver for Economic Inclusion, 
Frontiers in Blockchain (2020) 1, 3. 
71  See Wang/De Filippi, Self-Sovereign Identity in a Globalized World 6–7. 
72  See Low/Mik, Pause the Blockchain Legal Revolution 164; Morrison, Biometric Data Matching Risks and the Rise of Self-
Sovereign Identity, in Aggarwal et al. (eds.), Autonomous Systems and the Law (2019) 99, 101; Zetzsche et al., The Distributed 
Liability of Distributed Ledgers 1369, 1376–1377. 
73  Greene/Shilton, Platform privacies, New Media & Soc’y (2018) 1640. 
74  Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Framework for a European Digital Identity, 8, and art. 6a 7., 24–25. 
75  Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Framework for a European Digital Identity, art. 6a 2., 23. 
76  See Zetzsche et al., The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers 1376–7. 
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behavioural biometrics.77 If linked to financial information related to an individual, a nearly 
completely accurate picture of the customer can be created, building a “digital avatar” of that 
individual. 
 
IV.  The General Data Protection Regulation, Fundamental Rights and the 
State´s Obligation to Protect Human Dignity  
While mentioned legal unclarities persist, the increasingly excessive collection of customers’ 
device data requires close attention as it is prone to infringe on fundamental rights. This is 
even more concerning where legal responsibilities are unclear, muddying data safeguarding 
guarantees. This sentiment has been echoed by the European Data Protection Supervisor in 
their recent communication on the European Commission’s action plan for a comprehensive 
Union policy on preventing money laundering and terrorism financing, published on 7 May 
2020.78  
While the General Data Protection Regulation provides a specific framework for the 
protection of the fundamental right to data protection, its scope in fact extends to the 
protection of other related fundamental rights such as the fundamental right to privacy or 
freedom of expression,79 rendering its provisions especially important in relation to private 
actors, such as financial institutions. From a fundamental rights perspective and in 
accordance with the underlying principles of the General Data Protection Regulation, the 
protection of personal data is especially crucial in relation to private entities that are closely 
related to the public sector, either because they are partially owned or funded by the state 
or because they fulfil tasks in the public interest, thus acting on behalf of the state.80 The 
recent proposal of the Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications acknowledges 
that the interception of data created by terminal equipment creates delicate privacy issues 
which is a good initial starting point, particularly as websites visited, timing, and interaction 
with others81 map individuals’ behaviour and reveal delicate aspects of their lives to data 
controllers and processors. However, the data subjects’ consent remains a vulnerable link 
within the process of massive data collection activities conducted by financial institutions – 
especially if such a power imbalance between data subject and data controller exists as 
undoubtedly does between banks and their customers. 
                                                                
77  Rivner, Identity Crisis: Detecting Account Opening Fraud in the Age of Identity Commoditisation, Cyber Security: A Peer-
Reviewed Journal (2018) 316. 
78  See Communication from the Commission on an Action Plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money 
laundering and terrorist financing, 2020 O.J. (C 164) 21; European Data Protection Supervisor Press Release EDPS/2020/09, 
Data Protection requirements must go hand in hand with the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing 
(2020). 
79  Cf. Seubert/Becker, The Democratic Impact of Strengthening European Fundamental Rights in the Digital Age: The Example 
of Privacy Protection, German Law Journal 2021, 31 (43) (describing the relationship between privacy, democracy, freedom 
of communication and freedom of expression). 
80  E.g. for purposes of anti-money laundering measures, see Heiden, Banken als Erfüllungsgehilfen staatlicher Politik (2013) 
137. 
81  Cf. General Secretariat of the Council, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning 
the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications) – Mandate for negotiations with EP, No. 6087/21 of 10 
February 2021, recital 15. 




A parallel can be drawn between existing practices to present opaque terms of consent in 
regard to the processing of vast amounts of device data and secret surveillance by technical 
means. While the secret gathering of metadata concerning individuals by technical means 
has been held lawful in some cases,82 the existing court decisions take account of various 
factors. In contrast to the facts of the case P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, device data 
collection is conducted by financial service providers who are not state authorities. However, 
financial institutions function as agents of the state under certain circumstances and the 
same might be the case in regard to identity wallet providers if issued by the state as 
suggested in the recent proposal for an amendment of the eIDAS regulation.83 In regard to 
what data are potentially collected by financial service providers, the means of data collection 
are more invasive nowadays than in the aforementioned case brought before the ECHR. The 
data collected do not only comprise metadata but contain information about every potential 
aspect of individuals’ lives. Proportionality is moreover questionable as in the case of financial 
service providers collecting device data, the aim of this infringement of fundamental rights is 
not to protect life and limb, but rather – apart from preventing the financing of terrorism – to 
protect either the banks’ financial interests or as a consumer protection measure – as 
opposed to a measure necessary to maintain the financial system as a whole. The ECHR has 
stressed that the measure restricting the fundamental right to privacy must be foreseeable 
and lack arbitrariness. In the case where the data processing is based on consent, 
foreseeability of the data processing often is in fact not given, especially if the ability to deny 
consent under one’s own free will is compromised by the fact that financial services are 
essential in daily life and that there is a considerable imbalance of bargaining power between 
financial institutions and their customers.84 In order to prevent violations of fundamental 
rights, it is the state’s duty to not infringe fundamental rights when acting vis-à-vis its citizens 
on one hand, and also to prevent private entities from infringing its citizens’ fundamental 
rights on the other. 
 
V.  De lege ferenda approaches to mitigating fundamental rights concerns  
The state’s obligation to protect its citizens from infringements of their fundamental rights 
requires legal action on different levels: Appropriate regulation has to be passed in order to 
effectively protect citizens from infringements of their fundamental rights by private actors 
by laying down clear rules stipulating legal responsibility. In regard to digital identity 
management systems, it has to be accounted for that there exist obligations for financial 
institutions to guarantee data protection and data security, especially if specific technical 
implementations are not only essential for achieving the required level of data security, but 
determine whether, and from whose perspective, the data processed within the distributed 
                                                                
82  See P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom, 2001 Eur. Ct. H. R 42–51. 
83  Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Framework for a European Digital Identity, art. 6a 2., 23. 
84  Cf. Clifford et al., Pre-formulated Declarations of Data Subject Consent – Citizen-Consumer Empowerment and the Alignment 
of Data, Consumer and Competition Law Protections, German Law Journal 2019, 679 (680) (discussing similarities between 
data subjects and consumers vis-à-vis data controllers and businesses). 
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ledger are relatable to a natural person and thus qualify as personal data. Where personal 
data are stored immutably within a distributed data structure, clear legal responsibility has to 
be stipulated, and provisions have to clarify why certain data subject rights (such as the right 
to erasure) may not be able to be exercised due to technological limitations.  
Furthermore, the law has to set limits of self-determination in order to protect data subjects 
from consenting to extensive processing that reaches a level of non-transparency which may 
constitute de facto secret monitoring, which has been deemed lawful only under certain 
circumstances.85 Account has to be taken for situations typically involving an imbalance of 
power, such as for example between a consumer and a provider of essential services. The 
very subtle and nearly unnoticed collection of device data not only affects certain 
fundamental rights such as the right to privacy, freedom of speech, the right to data 
protection, or the right to effective remedy, it might even threaten the whole notion of human 
dignity constituting the philosophical and ethical maxim and the foundation of fundamental 
rights’ protection.86 One regulatory approach to protecting data subjects could be to prohibit 
certain contents of declarations of consent or to declare consent invalid if given under specific 
circumstances. In practice, however, these (or similar) legislative approaches have to be 
effectively enforced. This can only be achieved, and an effective protection of fundamental 
rights properly afforded to individuals, if the existing fundamental rights – and also the notion 
of consent according to GDPR – are interpreted by the courts of law in a dynamic way, 
considering the basic principles of human dignity and the potential impacts of ever-changing 
technologies and the evolving process of digitalisation. 
 
VI.  Outlook  
In distributed architectures for digital identity, personal data may be processed by multiple 
parties: Aside from entities such as credential issuers, and relying parties (those that verify 
credentials against the evidential record maintained on-ledger), new kinds of intermediaries 
have evolved. Digital identity wallet providers and the parties or entities responsible for 
permitting new nodes to the permissioned network have emerged – each bringing with them 
a suite of legal complexities. These legal nuances, in combination with the additional technical 
possibilities of the mobile device functioning as a gateway to the identity management system 
create delicate privacy issues: The mobile phone might provide the technical possibility to 
function as a surveillance tool for either financial institutions individually, or jointly with other 
actors such as wallet providers and state authorities. Legal responsibility within the 
distributed ledger, as well as the duties and obligations of digital identity wallet providers, are 
yet to be regulated – and perhaps require further restrictions regarding data harvesting 
practices. This is even more concerning in scenarios where personal data is immutably stored 
in a distributed manner, posing risks to specific fundamental data protection rights, as well 
as the fundamental right to privacy.  
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The judiciary will be confronted with the question as to what extent data processing by private 
actors for security reasons, or even commercial purposes, shall be allowed and whether there 
exists a limit to what is still compatible with the notion of the self-determined, free and 
sovereign individual – based on scrolling down and ticking a box saying “I consent”. Only a 
strict interpretation of consent in the light of fundamental rights against the backdrop of 
digitalization can ensure data subjects’ informational self-determination, especially in 
situations of power imbalance such as the case of financial service providers and their 
customers. This interpretation will have to consider the following circumstances: Firstly, 
financial services are inevitable in modern-day society and private service providers such as 
banks form part of critical infrastructure, which are highly supervised by state authorities, 
publicly funded and partially act in fulfilment of tasks in the public interest. Secondly, 
individuals’ mobile devices enable the collection of vast amounts of data, possibly including 
information about the most personal aspects of humans’ lives. And thirdly, ubiquitously 
storing data points on distributed ledgers as persistent identifiers constitutes a high privacy 
risk – even more so if digital identity architectures are broadly applied in areas related to the 
sovereign functions of the state such as taxation and democratic participation.87 This 
conversation is brought further into focus as credential-based architectures are being 
proposed as the backbone for proof of COVID-19 vaccination status;88 technology purported 
as being integral to a safe and secure post-covid environment, even though criticisms have 
been forthcoming from technical,89 ethics,90 and legal91 researchers. 
Whether these issues can be solved by interpreting the General Data Protection Regulation 
and the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection in a way that is aware of the 
implications of current and future technological data processing possibilities, and whether 
current legislative approaches in regulating wallets for digital identity provision92 are enough, 
is questionable. The ethical concept of human dignity, enshrined in the European concept of 
fundamental rights, does not only imply reactive protection of fundamental rights, but also 
requires proactive steps to be taken by legislators.93 This has been previously demonstrated 
by legislation and legal practice in the protection of physical integrity which is ensured by 
criminal law provisions which exclude the possibility to agree to major physical injury with the 
effect that the perpetrator cannot be prosecuted. The underlying value might be transposed 
                                                                
87  Like the digital identity framework proposed by the OECD, aiming to render taxation a more seamless experience by 
collecting massive amounts of data about taxpayers and combining them, see OECD, Tax Administration 3.0: The Digital 
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92  See Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Framework for a European Digital Identity, art. 6a 23–25. 
93  See Suzor, Lawless. The Secret Rules that Govern our Digital Lives (2019) 118. 
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to the protection of the integrity of the identity in the digital realm which is becoming more 
and more important in our daily lives. Thus, technical and legal innovation will have to go hand 
in hand, especially when it comes to (partly) automated processing of data such as in a 
distributed ledger. The need for clear regulation of responsibility and interpretation of the 
law by the judiciary which properly and adequately considers privacy implications in a 
dynamic manner is essential, especially considering cross-sector approaches to digital 
identity that not only determine the way we define identity in the 21st century but also impact 
on our understanding of democracy,94 responsibility, fundamental rights and society as a 
whole. Debates at the core of the issue will have to go beyond technical and legal reasoning, 
exploring comprehensive ethical and political approaches.  
 
                                                                
94  See Seubert/Becker, Democratic Impact of Strengthening European Fundamental Rights in the Digital Age 40–41. 
